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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TIMOTHY SAVAGE, aka
TIM SAVAGE, aka W. T. SAVAGE,
d/b/a SAVAGE CONSTRUCTION, and
~. T. SAVAGE CONCRETE, INC.,

~ILLIAM

Plaintiff,
Case No. 14603
vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
GARY WAYNE HILLIS, EXQUISITE
HOMEBUILDERS, INC., and THE
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff seeks to reverse an order of the Industrial
Commission which established that plaintiff, William Timothy
Savage, et al., had employed Gary wayne Hillis thus creating
a status of employer-employee between these two parties
respectively.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff, as employer of defendant Gary Wayne Hillis,
was ordered by the Industrial Commission to pay compensation to
Gary Wayne Hillis as a result of damages received by Hillis which
were sustained in an industrial accident.

Defendants request that

this Court sustain the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order of the Industrial Commission.
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---STATEMENT OF FACTS
While defendants agree with the basic factual statement
in plaintiff's brief, i t is felt that emphasis should be placed
on certain facts which were given only cursory treatment therein.
In obtaining the particular job in question, defendant,
Hillis, called plaintiff, Savage, when he became aware of Exquisite
Homebuilders' need of a new subcontractor for cement work.
pg. 11).

Hillis did not have the required contractor's license Md

could not, therefore, take on the job himself.
such a license.
jobs.

(Tr.

He knew Savage had

In fact, the same arrangement had been used on other,

Both men sought work together, Hillis as an employee of Savage/

because only one man had the license required to subcontract in
this state.

(Tr. pgs. 26-2 7)

(

In seeking the particular work in

question, as in times past, the two men discussed the employment
agreement on the morning they first talked with Exquisite Homebuilde'
(Tr. pgs. 22-23)

we

This was before either party did any work on

subdivision in question, the actual date being September 20.
pg. 22)

,

(Tr.

Consistent with their agreement with each other and wiw
)

Exquisite Homebuilders, once the work was completed, Exquisite
paid Savage who in turn paid Hillis.

(Tr. pg. 23)

It is true that Exquisite called Hillis personally to
begin the work which resulted in Hillis' injury,

(Tr. pg. 14) but

it is also true that Exquisite first tried to contact Savage and
could not because he was out of town.

Given the foregoing dis cussi;

of facts, the only reasonable inference possible is one consistent
with the thought that since Savage, the subcontractor, is out, we
will call his man Hillis to get the job done.

To infer from the
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!

phone call that Hillis was an employee hired separate and apart
from Savage is not realistic.

This is especially true in view of

the fact that Savage finished the work in question.

Mr. Hillis

stated at page 28 of the transcript:
Q.

A.

And it was your understanding, was it not,
that these people had contracted through
Mr. Savage, because he was a licensed
contractor to do a particular job?
Yes, sir.

(See also Tr. pg. 41, lines 15-19).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
WERE BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING AND
WERE ENTERED PURSUANT TO
§

§

35-l-85, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

35-1-85, u.c.A., 1953, reads:

After each formal hearing, it shall be the
duty of the commission to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law in writing and file the
same with its secretary. The findings and
conclusions of the commiss~on on tuest~ons of
fact shall be conclus~ve and f~na and shall
not be subject to review; such questions of
fact snail ~nclude ultimate facts and the
findings and conclusions of the commission.
The commission and every party to the action
or proceeding before the commission shall
have the right to appear in the review proceeding. Upon the hearing the court shall
enter judgment either affirming or setting
aside the award.
[emphasis added]
In interpreting this section, the Supreme Court has
said in McVicar v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 56 U. 342,
191 P. 1089, (1920), at 1090:
-3-
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The record is not without evidence to
support the findings and conclusions of the
commission • • • If the commission erred in
its findings of fact and conclusions, we
cannot correct the error
Since it
does not clearl and indubitabl a ear that
e ~scret~on o
e comm~ss1on as been
abused, its decision is final and unassailable.
[c~tation om~tted, emphasis added]
While that case was discussing the issue of dependency

~dl

the Court there states that dependency is a question of fact, certain'

it cannot be argued that the existence of an employer-employee
status is not also a question wherein the commission must consider
various facts and arrive at a conclusion.

Once having done this

the deter.mination of the commission is final and not subject to

When plaintiff asks the court "to reverse the findings of
the Industrial Commission and enter its Order accordingly to the
effect that neither William Timothy Savage, Savage Construction
Company, nor W. T. Savage Concrete, Inc. was the employer of Gary
Wayne Hillis on the first day of October, 1974" (plaintiff's brief
at page 6), he is asking the Court to do something which it cannot
do by statute.
Plaintiff's brief ignores the substantial evidence
before the

Comm~ssion

which was discussed above.

pla~d

The Commission

had credible evidence before it indicating the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between Savage and Hillis.

It does

not appear that "the discretion of the Commission has been abused",
its decision on this matter should be affirmed.
1

Plaintiff argues at page 5 of his brief:
-4-
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The fact the Mr. Savage paid cash to Mr
Hillis after the work was done and after Mr:
Hillis had been injured in no way creates the
condition of employer-employee as between
them on the date of the injury and one cannot
becom7 an employer by acquiescence or by the
creat~on of an employer-employee relationship
which did not exist at the time simply by
words used thereafter.
While those statements are true when standing alone,
certainly payment of monies is one fact to be considered by the
Commission and should logically be juxtaposed with the evidence
indicating that prior to the accident, an employer-employee relationship was established between Hillis and Savage.
POINT II.
§

35-l-42, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, OFFERS RELIEF

TO AN INJURED WORKMAN WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE OF A SUBCONTRACTOR BUT
NOT TO THE SUBCONTRACTOR, HIMSELF.
§

35-l-42, u.c.A., 1953, falls into a category of

workman's compensation statutes which inter alia. impose liability
for coverage upon a general contractor when a subcontractor does
not carry coverage for its employees.
~'

Vol. lA,

§

Larson, Workmen's Compensation

49.11 states, "The purpose of this legislation

was to protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors
by imposing ultimate liability on the presumably responsible
principal contractor

. • " (emphasis added]

The apparent intent of such statutes, then, is to protect
injured workmen.

The relief granted by statute is available to the

injured claimant and not to the "irresponsible and uninsured subcontractor".
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It is also stated in Larson, supra, that under most
statutes "the general contractor who has been required to pay
compensation in these circumstances can obtain reimbursement
from the subcontractor".

If, in this case, the subcontractor

were allowed to claim protection from§ 35-1-42,

u.c.A.,

1953,

the illogical position would be reached wherein Savage could force
Exquisite to pay the benefits ordered, and Exquisite in turn could
force Savage to reimburse Exquisite.

It should be obvious that

~e

legislature had no such intent in mind when they passed the section
in question.

As a result, Savage cannot, when he finds himself in

trouble due to his own "irresponsible" action, seek protection from
a statute designed to benefit his unprotected employee.

To so

construe this statute would kill any incentive on the part of subcontractors to carry coverage for their own employees.

Their own

irresponsibility would save them money in that they could avoid
paying premiums for coverage because they know they can claim
protection from this section and the general contractor will have
to pay.

The law should not and cannot be used to condone such

action.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that there
was substantial evidence before the Industrial commission to support
their finding that an employer-employee relationship existed betwee:
plaintiff, Savage, and defendant, Hillis.

There is no indicationc:

claim that the Commission abused its discretion in finding as it
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d:.

Finally, the benefits of§ 35-1-42, U.C.A., 1953, should not
protect an irresponsible subcontractor from the results of his
own actions.
DATED this _____ day of November,

1976.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT D. MOORE
Attorney for Defendants
Rawlings, Roberts & Black
400 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
328-9741
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent
to Louis M. Haynie, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 1847 West 2300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119, this _____ day of November, 1976.
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